While antidumping laws were originally developed as the international trade analogue of domestic market competition or antitrust policies, most vestiges of competition policy measures disappeared early in their evolution. Nonetheless, the formal justification for modern antidumping practice remains founded on the bedrock of countering "unfair" trading practices and preserving competitive markets. Consistent with this formal rationale, antidumping law has been replaced by competition policy mechanisms in some instances, such as in the European Union's internal market and in a number of bilateral free trade agreements. In this paper, we review the extent to which the European Union's use of antidumping proceedings in its extra-EU trade over the period 2001 to 2010 has been consonant with these quintessential competition policy objectives. Adapting the established methodology, we develop a "likelihood of predatory practice" index which categorizes antidumping cases in line with the probability that they indeed constitute cases of predatory behavior which might legitimately have triggered competition policy actions had they occurred in a domestic market context. In this regard, we update and consolidate a relatively thin literature that has considered the de facto motives underlying the application of modern trade remedy laws. Overall, we find more instances than previous studies where the EU antidumping measures address cases which would attract competition policy actions, although these are still a minority.
INTRODUCTION
Conceptually, trade defense instruments serve as the international trade analogue of domestic market competition policies. Consistent with this understanding of the role of trade defense instruments, their use has been replaced by competition laws within the European Union's (EU) internal market and some bilateral trade agreements, such as the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Cooperation Agreement and the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement. Given this characterization, trade defense instruments address predatory and other anti-competitive business practices of foreign firms and market-distorting measures of foreign governments. The economic benefit of trade defense instruments in theory is thus analogous to that of competition policy: there is a short-run cost to consumers since the policy intervention to prevent cut-throat price competition from foreign suppliers raises market prices in the first instance. However, by preserving competition, the policy intervention assures, in the longer run, lower prices than would have been the case had predation been allowed to succeed and domestic rival firms been forced out of the market, or new firms prevented from entering. Similarly, by countering foreign government subsidization of particular activities, which shifts market share to less efficient foreign suppliers, trade defense instruments ensure that efficient domestic firms are not driven out of the market forcing domestic consumers rely on what may eventually be higher-cost sources if and when the foreign subsidies are withdrawn. By the same token, trade defense instruments ensure that the global division of labor is based on genuine comparative advantage.
However, the link between the pattern of actual use and the formal stated policy motive of countering some form of predatory practice in the absence of competition policy and other market regulatory mechanisms in the international domain, has been found in many analyses to be weak. In this paper, we review the extent to which the European Union's use of antidumping proceedings in its extra-EU trade in the WTO era has been consonant with these quintessential competition policy objectives.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the traditional theoretical construction of trade defense instruments as the international surrogate for competition policy. Section 3 presents the methodology and findings of previous empirical studies. Our methodology, which introduces several changes to earlier studies, is described in section 4, followed by a discussion of results in Section 5.
COMPETITION POLICY MOTIVES FOR ANTIDUMPING MEASURES
Trade remedies have been traditionally characterized as the international trade analogue of internal market competition policies. This characterization has persisted over the years notwithstanding important differences in the substantive construction of trade defense instruments and competition law provisions that emerged at a very early stage of the development of these respective legal frameworks 1 , and notwithstanding a modern pattern of use of antidumping measures that in the view of many observers lends little evidentiary support for the characterization.
Competition policy concerns itself with a wide variety of corporate business practices that restrain competition in the market place. The practices targeted are primarily those that either (a) raise consumer prices through monopolization, cartelization, collusive practices such as marketsharing agreements, price fixing, retail price maintenance and so forth; or (b) exclusionary practices that deny access to markets to competitors, such as refusal to supply, denial of access to networks, exclusive dealing arrangements, price discrimination in selling to competing businesses (typically dominant sellers favoring firms associated with them, or vertically integrated firms selling at discriminatorily high prices to downstream un-integrated competitors) or abusing a dominant position in one market to gain market share in another through tied selling. Many of these practices raise trade frictions; this has prompted multilateral initiatives to develop stronger competition policy disciplines into the WTO rules. Trade defense instruments address just one segment, and a fairly narrow one at that, of the range of competition policy concerns: predatory pricing.
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Under competition law, predatory pricing is understood as a deliberate strategy to drive competitors out of the market by setting very low prices (e.g., "cut-throat pricing"), including at below average variable costs. Since the price undercutting strategy reduces profits in the short run, and possibly results in losses that must be cross-subsidized from profits in other areas of the firm's activity, the presumption is that, having established a dominant position or outright monopoly, the predator firm will then seek to recoup the losses by raising prices and generating
1
The first AD law, which was introduced in Canada in 1904, was motivated by concerns over predation (see Finger 1992 and Sykes 1998 for accounts) . New Zealand, which followed Canada in adopting AD legislation in 1905, targeted selective price cutting by US-based International Harvester which threatened to create a monopoly on agricultural equipment in the New Zealand market (Ciuriak 2005) . Similarly, the US Antidumping Act of 1916, which was in substance an extension of its antitrust law (Finger 1992) , included a requirement that the dumping had to "be done with the intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the United States, or of preventing the establishment of an industry in the United States, or of restraining or monopolizing any part of trade and commerce in such articles in the United States" (Committee on Ways and Means 1993: 417, cited in Stiglitz 1997) . The formal articulation of TDI in the economic literature as the international analogue to domestic competition policy goes back to at least Viner (1923) . However, as early as 1921, the scope of US AD law was widened to provide governmental relief against any instances of dumping, regardless of intent. As Finger (1992: 129) notes: "The 1921 act completes the shift of criteria. Any mention of antitrust criteria -conspiracy, combination, or restraint of competition -is gone. Antitrust's injury-to-competition standard has been replaced by a diversion-of-business standard." It is the latter standard that has prevailed in WTO law and general practice since.
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Note that predatory pricing through foreign affiliates is addressed by competition policy authorities; it is only in cross-border trade that trade defense instruments come into play. In light of the fact that foreign affiliate sales now exceed cross-border trade by a good margin, trade defense instruments must be considered to have only a niche role in addressing international competition issues involving predation. As well, in an intra-EU context, anti-subsidy measures that are in other jurisdictions dealt with through countervailing duties are addressed through competition measures dealing with state aid. Finally, note also that competition laws address price discrimination and that dumping is by definition price discrimination across borders. However, since the welfare effects of price discrimination are generally ambiguous, competition authorities only step in when there is abuse, which in this context involves the customers that might be gouged by high prices; antidumping measures by contrast are used by authorities in the jurisdiction that is benefiting from the lower prices. So there is no parallel in this case. monopoly profits. Accordingly, for the strategy to succeed, arbitrage must not be possible (which is not an unlikely condition in international trade given the fixed costs of market entry) -market entry barriers must be high or the dominant firm must be in a position to subsequently prevent competitive entry into the market by erecting artificial barriers to entry (e.g., through advertising), or through resort to exclusionary practices on the gamble that these might escape sanctions from competition policy authorities.
Conversely, to trigger antidumping measures, dumping must create injury to domestic industry. Hence, parallel to predatory pricing in a domestic context, it too involves price competition that is injurious. In both instances, the remedial provisions contemplate foregoing the welfare benefits to consumers of temporarily lower prices in order to prevent injury to the competitors of the dumping/predatory firm, which would lead in the longer term to damage to consumers in the eyes of the competition authorities (a consequence that is, interestingly, of no importance to trade defense authorities, as they look no further than the damage to the domestic competitor 3 ).
Since dumping as a predatory pricing strategy in an international setting inherently involves traded goods, successful execution of the strategy must also involve some ability to exclude subsequent new entry not only of new domestic competitors that might face high start-up costs, but also of established global competitors from other countries. The bar that a predatory pricing strategy must clear to succeed in an international setting is thus higher than in a domestic setting. At first blush, the rarity of successful predation prosecutions under competition law therefore stands in stark contrast to the frequency of successful antidumping claims. However, the punitive nature of the sanctions in competition cases also stands in sharp contrast to the remedial nature of antidumping measures. So it is difficult to draw inferences concerning the frequency of predatory behavior from frequency of application of the two types of measures. That being said, the general consensus of economists examining the application of antidumping measures is in line with Blonigen (2006: 875) :
"Most economists would worry about price dumping only if such behaviour were predatory in nature and intended to drive out domestic-market competitors. The definition of dumping is clearly much broader, so that practices that are not necessarily anti-competitive, such as price discrimination or pricing below average cost, are included as 'unfair' dumping behaviour."
PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR ANTI-PREDATORY ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES
Several papers have applied a suite of criteria to individual antidumping cases to characterize them in terms of the possibility of successful predation and thus to bring out the extent to which 3 This contrast is brought out in comments from USITC Commissioners Janet Nuzum and David Rohr remarking on the results of a study showing welfare costs from the use of trade remedies: "it must be remembered that the purpose of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws is not to protect consumers, but rather to protect producers. Inevitably, some cost is associated with this purpose. However, unlike the antitrust laws, which are designed to protect consumer interests, the function of the AD/CVD laws is, indeed, to protect firms and workers engaged in production activities in the United States." Cited in Tavares (2001). the use of antidumping measures plausibly stands in place of comparable competition policies in a domestic setting. Bourgeois and Messerlin (1998;  henceforth B&M) applied a five-screen test to check for the likelihood that EU antidumping applications were in a context that would be considered consistent with standard competition policy motives, such as countering predatory practices.
They assessed 461 of the 658 antidumping cases initiated between 1980 and 1997 for which adequate information was available to apply their methodology.
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The B&M screens were as follows: 1. Dominant market position of the dumping firms: The criterion used by B&M for assessing possible dominance is based on the history of competition enforcement in the EU, according to which a market share of 40% is necessary for a firm to have a dominant position. B&M increased the likelihood of finding dominance by applying the test on a forecast basis (the test was applied on the basis of projected market share in the absence of trade remedies, where the projection was done on the basis of simple extrapolation of growth of the market share in the period prior to the application of measures), and the market share was the combined market share of all the firms targeted in the investigation. Despite the conservative bias thus introduced, this test lead to the conclusion that two thirds (311 of the 461 cases) were not cases countering anticompetitive behavior. 2. No dumping or injury found: The second test examined the 150 remaining cases and eliminated those cases which were terminated by negative outcomes for all the countries involved, on the reasoning that there is no reason to suppose that antidumping cases are a response to predatory behavior if the EU investigations concluded that "no injury" or "no dumping" was present. 14 cases were screened out at this stage, leaving 136 potentially predatory cases. 3. Four or more countries are targeted simultaneously: The third test eliminated cases where more than three countries were involved in the investigation on grounds that joint predatory behavior in such cases would require an implausible level of coordination. 75 cases were screened out at this stage. 4. Eight or more firms are targeted simultaneously: The fourth test eliminated cases on a similar rationale that predatory behavior amongst many firms would involve very high costs of maintaining a "joint monopoly". 17 of the remaining 61 cases were screened out on these grounds, leaving 44 potentially predatory cases. 5. The EU market is competitive: The fifth test examined market concentration in the EU for 28 of the remaining 44 cases where the aggregate market shares of EU firms and the total number of EU firms identified as being in the market was provided in case documentation. The 197 omitted cases fall into three groups: anti-circumvention cases (which are not independent new cases); investigations that were not concluded officially (e.g., where the EC firms withdrew the complaint), and a few cases terminated by the Commission but for which information was not available; see B&M (1998: 140) .
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For the other 16 cases the domestic market share was not available. In two of these cases, foreign firms held small (4.5% and 6.1%) market shares while facing five and nine EU firms, respectively. B&M reasoned that both the low foreign market shares and the relatively high number of EU competitors suggested the existence of Since market shares of individual firms were not available, B&M calculated HerfindahlHirschman indexes (HHIs) based on extreme assumptions: a minimum HHI based on the assumption that the foreign firms and the EU firms split their respective market shares evenly; and a maximum HHI based on the assumption that one foreign firm has virtually the entire foreign market share and one EU firm has virtually the whole EU market share, with the remaining firms having market shares close to zero. On the basis of these pseudo-HHIs, and using a threshold HHI of 0.18 for the existence of a concentrated market structure, B&M divided the 28 cases into three groups: (i) In four of the cases both the minimum and maximum pseudo-HHI was below 0.18, their cutoff for a concentrated market, and so were ruled out; (ii) 12 cases featured minimum pseudo-HHIs below the cutoff but maximums above the cutoff, leaving them indeterminate, in the absence of actual information on firm market shares; and (iii) 12 cases featured both minimum and maximum pseudo-HHIs above the cutoff, leaving this group as clear-cut candidates for at least the possibility of successful predation.
Finally, B&M considered a sixth test, namely whether there are high barriers to entry in the industry, a necessary pre-condition for successful predation. They did not, however, treat this as a screen.
In sum, "12 cases -that is, only 2 percent of the 461 cases screened -are possible candidates for a closer examination of predatory behavior" (Bourgeois and Messerlin 1998: 144) . B&M considered that: "This conclusion is very conservative and overstates the situation for three reasons: 7 of these 12 cases exhibit declining or stable minimum and maximum HHIs between the initial and final periods; 4 other cases involve China (for which our HHI estimates always assume the existence of one producer and exporter, and hence they systematically underestimate the level of competition and overestimate the HHIs); and none of these 12 cases involve sophisticated products for which entry barriers could be high" (Bourgeois and Messerlin 1998: 144) Shin (1998) examined 451 antidumping investigations in the United States over the period [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] . He adopted a screening approach similar to B&M's, eliminating as possible cases of predation those instances where: 1. Negative findings were made, on the grounds that predatory intent could not have been in play if there was insufficient evidence for dumping or injury, reducing the sample of possible predation to 288; 2. The US domestic industry was not concentrated, because the existence of many US producers is indicative of low minimum efficient scale or low barriers to entry and predatory dumping would therefore unlikely to be successful. For this purpose, Shin calculated the HHI for the HS four or five-digit sector in which the protection was provided, with an HHI of 0.18 or higher indicating a "highly concentrated" industry in US antitrust law. Shin acknowledged that the industry groupings at this level competitive markets that would not lend themselves to successful predation and so excluded these, while leaving the remaining 14 cases without a definitive conclusion.
might encompass a broader group of products than that targeted by the antidumping measures but argued that firms in these groups may possess the technology and organization to produce the product if it becomes profitable and/or the products within the wider grouping may also be close demand substitutes for the targeted product. Since this test excluded almost all cases, Shin also included cases where the HHI was below 0.18 at the four-or five-digit level but where USITC case data allowed the construction of a pseudo-HHI on the assumption that the USITC-reported market shares are split evenly amongst the number of firms indicated in the case documentation. This boosted his potential predatory case count to 86. 3. There were numerous exporters in the targeted country, since successful coordination in bearing the initial losses and in the subsequent recoupment of those losses is more difficult the greater the number of players. Shin calculated pseudo-HHIs from the case documentation. This eliminated only a small percentage of the cases, leaving 75 in the running. 4. There were five or more countries targeted, for the same coordination reasons, reducing the number of potential cases to 62. 5. Imports did not have a high degree of penetration or were not growing rapidly, since it is unlikely that dumping could create monopoly power for the foreign firms if imports were not making significant inroads into the market. Shin eliminated those cases where the case documentation showed import penetration of 20% or less, and those where negative findings were issued by the USITC on "critical circumstances", i.e. where imports did not increase rapidly.
Applying these screens, Shin found 39 of the original 451 cases -i.e. 8.6% of all cases screenedto have potentially involved predatory motives.
As can be seen, Shin's "screens" are conceptually similar to the B&M screens but with some different judgements concerning the threshold levels for screening out cases. His results are also similar to B&M's showing that only a small percentage of US cases meet the criteria that would establish them as potentially involving predatory practices.
An earlier study by Hutton and Trebilcock (1990) , examining 30 Canadian antidumping cases, considered contextual clues as to whether competition concerns were at issue. They similarly screened out cases where certain conditions are not met. However, their criteria for exclusion were somewhat different -they excluded cases from being considered as potentially predatory where: 1. global excess capacity in the industry implied that dumping was the natural firm-level competitive response and the resultant exit of the least efficient producers to reduce global capacity would be a good thing. 14 of the 30 cases could be excluded on this criterion (nine of which were steel cases); 2. cyclical lags in production and climatic variation in agriculture resulted in pricing below marginal cost to sell large quantities of the product, which was the rational firm-level response and not indicative of predatory intent. Four cases could be excluded on this criterion (all of them agricultural); 3. low prices were used to introduce products into a market and/or to learn by doing as the firm found its way in the market, which is legitimate business practice that benefits society and raises no predatory concerns as firms acting in this fashion clearly do not have market power. Two cases involved new product introductions and so could be excluded on this ground; 4. market conditions did not allow the eventual raising of prices to recoup short-term losses due to the predatory strategy; in particular, successful predation is only possible where:  market demand is inelastic (otherwise an attempt to raise prices reduces revenues). Six cases involved elastic demand and so could be excluded;  there are sufficient barriers to entry to prevent domestic firms from re-entering the market if the successful predator attempts to raise prices to recoup its losses. 11 cases featured low barriers to entry; and  the firm has a dominant position internationally so that producers from third countries are not in a position to step in and compete away excess profits once the domestic industry has been driven from the market. This test was sufficient to exclude all the cases; 5. the domestic industry had market power (including instances where the domestic industry is a monopolist) and antidumping measures were used to protect rents. At least 14 cases involved sectors where domestic market power was not in evidence.
In sum, none of the 30 Canadian cases was considered as a plausible candidate for consideration as a predatory dumping case, most being ruled out on multiple grounds. The absence of international market power was easily the most consistent reason for the impracticality of a predatory strategy.
Finally, in a previous study (Bienen/Ciuriak/Picarello 2012) of 64 EU antidumping cases initiated in the period 2005 to 2010, applying an approach adapted from B&M, we found seven cases (or 11% of the cases screened) where predatory practice might have been addressed. Specifically, four of the 64 cases were screened out for targeting four or more countries (screen 1), and 37 others because the exporters targeted number eight or more in each case (screen 2). 16 others were screened out because the combined market share of the targeted exporters was too low to be considered as occupying a dominant position in the EU market (screen 3). None of the remaining cases was screened out by the remaining two screens, i.e. a concentrated EU market or a negative finding of the Commission's investigations. Finally, if a sixth screen was applied to the seven remaining cases -i.e. the existence of global market power in order to prevent entry of new competitors after the predation period -only one case remained as a potential case of predatory behavior.
In sum, then, none of the studies undertaken so far has found any notable support for the justification of antidumping measures as a device to correct anticompetitive, predatory practices in international trade, and this despite the fact that each of the studies was considered by the respective authors as conservative by setting high thresholds for a finding that no predatory practice was at play in any given case.
We agree that such a conservative bias was at play at the level of individual screens. However, in three of the studies (Bourgeois and Messerlin 1998 , Shin 1998 and Bienen et al. 2012 ) the failure of a case to meet any single screen was considered as sufficient for a finding of obvious absence of a predatory practice. This constitutes an unduly strict standard of assessment, as is discussed in the following section, and warrants a reassessment of cases.
METHODOLOGY
Comparing the methods and responses of competition authorities to alleged predatory pricing in a domestic context with those of trade defense authorities to alleged dumping is not straightforward. In order to prove the existence of predatory pricing competition authorities usually apply a three stage process. First, it has to be assessed if the predator is a dominant firm. If this is not the case, the investigation stops. Dominance can be held by a single firm ("single dominance"), or jointly by two or more firms ("collective dominance"). Collective dominance exists when the involved undertakings present themselves in the market in a joint manner acting in a parallel way with regard to the most important competitive parameters (prices, output, etc.) without having reached any form of implicit or explicit agreement. Collective dominance arises especially in oligopolistic markets, where companies do not need an explicit agreement in order to maintain price or reduce output compared to competitive levels. Second, if dominance has been ascertained, the authority has to determine if through the aggressive pricing policy the dominant firm sacrifices short-term profits. 6 Third, in some countries the competition authority also has to show that the short-term loss can be recouped by the dominant firm.
Conversely, in order to impose antidumping measures trade defense authorities must first show that dumping, i.e. cross-border price discrimination, takes place. This may or may not involve sales at prices below (variable or total costs). Second, it must be shown that the domestic industry of the importing country is injured by the dumping practice.
In order to determine if antidumping meets competition policy standards, one would ideally apply the competition policy methodology to antidumping cases. However, this is possible only 6
In competition policy practice, there is an international convergence among authorities to apply the Areeda/ Turner rule. The Areeda/Turner rule distinguishes three different situations, depending on whether prices charged during the predation period are below average variable costs, between average variable costs and average total costs, or above total costs: (1) Only prices below average variable costs (as proxy of marginal costs) charged by dominant firms are usually considered predatory pricing. In fact, a firm should normally find it rational to stop production rather than charging prices below variable costs, considering that for each additional unit of product supplied, additional losses are incurred. The only explanation for such "prima facie" irrational behaviour would be the expectation for higher profits at a later stage. (2) Prices above average variable costs but below average total costs, on the other hand, may be considered predatory when they are clearly associated with an exclusionary intent. (3) Prices above average total costs are not considered predatory. See Gangi/Bienen (2010: 102ff.) .
to a limited extent, given the information constraints in case documentation. Therefore we calculate a likelihood-of-predatory-practice (LOPP) index by assessing the following parameters:
1. Dominance of targeted exporters in the importing country's domestic market We consider, that cases in which the combined share of the targeted firms on the importing country domestic market is 40% or higher. A quantitative threshold for the determination of market dominance is taken because it is simple to handle and usually provided in case documentation. The 40% threshold is based on the history of EU competition law enforcement as to what constitutes a dominant position. 7 The fact that we take the combined market share of targeted firms is based on the implicit (and strong) assumption that all targeted firms are collectively dominant. However, as antidumping case documentation does not provide company specific market shares, the analysis can only be based on the combined market share.
To alleviate the assumption of collective dominance of all targeted firms, we apply two qualifying tests which identify those cases where collective predatory practice is particularly unlikely due to coordination problems:
2. Four or more countries are targeted. This screen rules out cases where an implausible level of coordination across countries would be required.
Eight or more foreign firms are targeted
This screen similarly rules out cases where an implausible level of coordination, across firms in this instance, would be required.
A test which would emulate the sacrifice of short-term profits of the dumping firms is not possible due to lack of data. Likewise, a recoupment test in the strict sense is not possible in the strict sense. However, as a proxy for the existence of high barriers to entry, which would facilitate post-predation period recoupment of losses, we assess the EU market structure. Where the EU market is concentrated, entry barriers are likely to be high, as is the probability to recoup losses. A predatory practice in such a situation cannot be discarded:
The EU domestic market is concentrated
We measure market concentration, in line with the literature, through the HHI, with a threshold for a concentrated market of 0.18. Since market shares of individual companies are not available, we calculate an approximate range for the HHI based on the details provided in the case documentation. This usually provides the market share for (at least) the targeted imports, Union industry, and imports from other countries. The maximum HHI is calculated assuming that each set of suppliers is represented by only one firm. Conversely, the minimum HHI is calculated assuming that all companies in each set of suppliers have the same market share.
Given the level of aggregation of information provided in most case documentation, the maximum HHI typically exceeds 0.18 8 and seriously overstates the actual degree of market concentration. Therefore, the 0.18 threshold is applied to the simple HHI. Furthermore, cases where the HHI is close to the threshold (i.e. those where the average HHI is between 0.15 and 0.21) are considered as "inconclusive". In some cases where the HHI could not be calculated a judgement call was made regarding the degree of market concentration.
Aggregation: calculation of LOPP index
In each of the four tests, we assign a value of "1" if a case meets the test for predatory practice; if the case does not meet the test, a value of "-1", and if the test is inconclusive or no data are available, a value of "0". The individual values are then summed up into the LOPP index, ranging from -4 to +4, where a positive value indicates a likelihood of predatory practice while a negative one indicates the likelihood of absence of such practice.
Our methodology is similar to the one of B&M (1998) and Shin (1998) with regard to the individual tests. However, the main methodical difference to these studies is that we apply the tests to all cases, rather than screening out cases sequentially. We do so because it cannot be discarded that cases are predatory even where they do not meet one of the tests; e.g. there might be more than eight exporters to a case but if these are orchestrated by the Government (which could be the case especially in a non-market economy country) a predatory practice might still be at work. Under previous studies, such a case would have been considered as non-predatory.
We apply the methodology to 100 EU antidumping cases 9 initiated during the period 2001-2010 which were not terminated due to a finding of no or de minimis dumping. 10 Note that this is another difference to the standard methodology used in the literature, where termination of a case because of no dumping or no injury is considered as an indication for a lack of predatory practice. However, only a finding of no dumping is conclusive evidence of an absence of predatory pricing. A finding of no injury could also mean that a predatory attempt was not successful. In general, cases with negative outcomes except the no dumping finding may contain features that prompted the authorities to undertake investigations and it is possible that complaints are withdrawn because the firms involved strike an agreement; agreements struck under duress are not necessarily indicative of an absence of competition policy concerns, they might signify quite the opposite.
Even more than the approach of B&M and Shin, our methodology is conservative in that it allows many cases to be considered as potentially predatory where the number of countries targeted and the number of exporters involved are still quite large. We consider this as appropriate since, in the modern context of hyper-specialization of production due to the increasingly refined division of labor amongst firms, a low level of concentration of an industry may mask a high degree of concentration in specialized niche products. Often, in industries that supply what appear to be highly substitutable commodity inputs into production processes, the ability of firms to produce to the exact specifications required by the industrial users varies. In some of these cases, there may be significant non-tariff barriers to entry into a market since the customers may have to pre-clear the supplier's production processes. For example, in the case of steel pipe that is used for drilling oil and gas exploration wells, end users need to approve a product from a new source after site visits to confirm that specification requirements have been met, and to receive a guarantee of the quality and availability of the new products, since the risk of using an unknown product in the drilling business, even if it has an international certification, is simply too high.
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RESULTS
Out of the 100 cases assessed, 47% have a positive LOPP index score (indicating that predatory behavior cannot be discarded), compared to 35% with a negative score. In line with this, the mean LOPP index score is +0.36, showing a slight tendency that antidumping cases are found in environments which could give rise to anticompetitive behavior.
More interestingly, relatively few cases fall into the extremes (Figure 1 ): only five cases do not meet any of the tests (i.e. have a score of -4), while 9 out of 100 (9%) meet all of the tests and thus would have been included among the cases of potential predatory pricing if the "standard" methodology had been applied. This percentage is in line with the results of B&M (1998), Shin (1998) and our earlier study (Bienen et al. 2012) , as described in section 3 above. 
Number of cases
Score
When looking at the products concerned by the "extreme" cases, those with the highest likelihood of predatory pricing (Table 1) tend to be manufactured and to some extent differentiated products (such as refrigerators or cargo scanning systems), which are at least candidates for a classic oligopolistic strategy, or industrial materials/chemicals, which are characterized by the importance of scale economies. The question thus arises of whether market share competition is a potentially successful strategy for undifferentiated products. One of the classic motives for dumping is sporadic dumping by industries with high fixed costs which sell aggressively during economic slowdowns to maintain production levels. But these theories also capture the steel cases which dominate the cases which lack all characteristics of predatory dumping (Table 2 ). This area requires further research. 
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